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Liability of Police Officers for Misuse
of Their Weapons
Herbert E. Greenstone*
T HE FOCUS OF THIS ARTICLE is twofold: it will begin by examining
the historical development of the body of law which deals with
the liability of the police officer for the negligent use of his weapons,
and it will attempt to consider the practical problems confronting the
attorney for the injured plaintiff in marshalling his evidence and pre-
senting his case. The author has represented plaintiffs in personal in-
jury litigation for twenty-five years, and his interest lies particularly in
the recovery of civil damages to compensate those who have been in-
jured as a result of the negligent misconduct of others. Although the
instant topic concerns the officer's liability, a consideration of municipal
liability for the negligent acts of its police officers is relevant. Since
police officers as a rule have limited financial resources, the main thrust
to impose liability must often be directed against the municipal em-
ployer, as it is in a better financial position to bear any loss as the result
of its agent's negligence.'
Historical Background of Governmental Immunity
The history of the doctrine holding that "the King can do no wrong,"
couched in terms of sovereign immunity, has been the subject of volu-
minous research in the legal journals.2 It has been said that the doctrine
has resulted from a misinterpretation of the law, and as a practical
matter the doctrine of sovereign immunity never really existed.3 Soy-
* Of the New Jersey Bar; partner in the law firm of Greenstone & Greenstone, of
Newark, New Jersey.
1 Mathes and Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers
in Damage Actions, 53 Geo. L. J. 889, 908 (1965). This article will not consider the
liability of the surety on the policeman's official bond where such bond is statutorily
required; it should be recognized, however, that within the monetary limits of the
bond and subject to the injury being caused by an act within the scope of the
officer's employment, such bond will increase the financial ability of the policeman
to respond in damages. An indemnity statute, whereby the municipality indemnifies
the police officer for damages assessed against him by reason of his on-duty negli-
gence, has the same effect. See Andrews v. Porter, 70 Ill. App.2d 202, 217 N.E.2d
305 (1966). The term "municipality" will be used throughout this article to mean
municipal employer, state employer, or federal employer, as the principles of li-
ability in all cases are the same.
2 A partial listing includes: Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1,
129, 229 (1924-25), 36 Yale L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926), 28 Colum. L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928);
Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437
(1941); Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort
Liability, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 214 (1942); Green, Municipal Liability for
Torts, 38 Ill. L. Rev. 355 (1944); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41
(1949); Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29
U. Chi. L. Rev. 435 (1962); 2 Encyc. of Negl. §§ 430-436 (1962).
3 Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1963).
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ereign immunity seems to find its earliest application in an English
case, Russell v. Men of Devon.4 The decision was predicated upon the
absence of funds in the treasury of Devon to pay judgments arising
out of tort claims, as well as the fear of a multitude of such suits.
5
Times inexorably change; so do prevailing conceptions of society and
the relationship between society and its individual members. The theory
that the individual can better bear any given loss than can the modern
State is shelved as archaic by all save the few courts still adhering to
strands of sovereign immunity., The taxing power has enabled municipal
corporations to amass sums with which to pay the claims and just obliga-
tions which accrue in the conduct of municipal affairs. The tort law has,
by and large, kept abreast of changes in our lives. The rapidity of our
growth necessitated this flexibility. The technological millennium, from
the occasional squib exploding in a market place, the occasional barrel
falling from a building, or the occasional carriage breaking down, to
the incredible number of casualties occurring on our public highways
and the vast number of injuries resulting from more and more compli-
cated machinery, has been telescoped into little more than a century.
The necessity of spreading the risks of injury equitably is both apparent
and real.7 The state has expressed its interest in this basic problem by
its insistence that private corporations accept the responsibility for cer-
tain phases of the risk which they themselves produce, as in the require-
ment, almost universal, that all firms make ample provision for work-
men's compensation insurance. If such is the attitude of state govern-
ments concerning the private sphere, why should not liability of gov-
ernment for the hurts inflicted by its agents and employees be im-
posed under the same general principles as apply to individuals and
private corporate groups? 9 Mr. Justice Holmes stated the problem
eloquently:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more re-
volting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitations of the
past.9
4 2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). The doctrine was brought to the
United States in Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812). Professor Borchard indi-
cates that the application of the doctrine in the United States is "one of the mys-
teries of legal evolution." 34 Yale L. J. 1, 4 (1924).
5 Similar reasoning in a related context may be found in more recent cases: e.g.,
Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla., 1965).
6 "The concept of liability in this area is an expanding one." Burns v. City of New
York, 6 A.D.2d 30, 174 N.Y.S.2d 192, 195 (1958).
7 Our most progressive courts have adopted this approach in other areas of the law.
Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Santor v. A.
and M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
8 Green, Freedom of Litigation, 38 Ill. L. Rev. 355 (1944); Fisher v. City of Miami,
supra, n. 5.
9 Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
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POLICE MISUSE OF WEAPONS
If court-created sovereign immunity once served a valid need and
purpose, that need and purpose are history now, and the new needs of
the individual citizen vis-a-vis his state are disserved by the archaic
doctrine.
Destruction of Governmental Immunity
The courts have responded to this need. The trend today in most
jurisdictions seems to be toward the abrogation of municipal tort im-
munity.' 0 In many jurisdictions liability has been imposed upon a mu-
nicipality in the same manner as if it were a private individual or cor-
poration.' But old habits die hard. A rationale was introduced which
seemed to provide compensation for injuries in the rawest cases, but
still maintained the myth of the sovereignty of the governmental unit.
That rationale differentiates between torts committed by an agent in
the discharge of a governmental function and those committed by an
agent while engaged in a proprietary, i.e., non-governmental, task; 12 in
the former situation the municipal corporation was held immune from
liability, while in the latter liability attached. This distinction, however,
is gradually disappearing. More and more courts are imposing liability
for the negligent acts of agents upon the municipal employer even where
the activity from which the tort ensues would be considered govern-
mental. 13 These decisions have great relevance to the instant problem,
10 26 NACCA L. J. 31 (1960); Frosser, Law of Torts, 1005 (3d ed. 1964); 2 Harper
and James, Law of Torts, 1612 (1957).
11 See dissenting opinion of Judge Carroll, Fisher v. City of Miami, 160 So.2d 57(Fla. 1964), rev'd, supra n. 5; Buchholz v. City of Sioux Falls, 77 S.D. 322, 91 N.W.2d
606 (1958); Abrahamsohn v. City of Ceres, 90 Cal. App.2d 523, 203 P.2d 98 (1949);
Craig v. City of Charleston, 180 Ill. 154, 54 N.E. 184 (1899).
12 Demars v. Town of Mansura, 246 La. 873, 166 So.2d 328 (1964). Where a mu-
nicipality has been engaged in a proprietary function, the municipality has been
held liable for negligence on ordinary common-law negligence principles. See,
Weeks v. City of Newark, 62 N. J. Super. 166, 162 A.2d 314 (1960), aff'd, 34 N.J. 250,
168 A.2d 11 (1961).
13 The leading case of Muskopf v. Corning Hospital, 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457(1961), in repudiating municipal immunity, held that the city's responsibility extends
to the negligent acts of all its agents acting in a ministerial, as opposed to discretion-
ary, capacity. See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); and
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193 (Fla. 1957). The
Hargrove case held that the municipality would be liable for the negligence of its
police officers under respondeat superior principles. Both Muskopf and Hargrove
distinguish between ministerial acts of municipal agents and the necessarily dis-
cretionary exercise of the legislative or judicial function, retaining the municipal
immunity only for torts committed by agents in the latter instances. See Lipman v.
Brisbane Elementary School District, 55 Cal.2d 224, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 465(1961); Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App.2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294(1965). The acts of police officers involving the use of their weapons have generally
been considered non-discretionary under the Muskopf-Hargrove formulation. See
Robinson v. Smith, 211 Cal. App.2d 473, 27 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1962); Sherbutte v.
Marine City, 374 Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920, 923 (1964). It should be noted here that
municipal liability in Florida has been expanded beyond Hargrove to include
(Continued on next page)
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because the activities of police officers within the scope of their duties
have gqnerally been classified as the performance of a governmental
function. 14
Doctrinally, the courts have had no difficulty imposing individual
liability upon the police officer for the negligent or wrongful acts com-
mitted in discharge of his official duties, 15 regardless of the status of
the sovereign immunity doctrine in any particular jurisdiction; that is
to say, it is no defense for a police officer to state that he was acting in
the course of his official duties where the municipal employer is immune
from tort liability. He is unable to hide behind the cloak of govern-
mental immunity to excuse his own wrongful conduct. 6
The Nature of the Liability Imposed Upon the Police Officer
The cases brought against police officers for injuries sustained as a
result of negligence in the use of weaponry fall into two broad categories:
(1) where the subject of an arrest or an attempted apprehension is
injured as the result of the use of excessive force by the police officer;
(2) where an innocent bystander is injured as the result of the careless
aim or ricocheting of an officer's bullet aimed at a fugitive, or as the
result of the officer heedlessly "fooling" with his weapon, or where the
weapon is discharged accidentally during cleaning or repair. We will
consider how the courts have dealt with both types of situations.
Use of Excessive Force in Effecting Arrest
The fundamental problem which the court must resolve in setting
down a rule of law to govern police conduct is the balancing of possible
inefficiencies in the apprehension of criminals resulting from the police
officer's fear of subjection to the "retaliation" of a civil suit by a party
injured by his hands, 17 against the fear that society will have no remedy
(Continued from preceding page)
intentional torts committed by municipal employees acting within the scope of
their employment. City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla., 1965).
14 Graysneck v. Heard, 422 Pa. 11, 220 A.2d 893 (1966); Anderson v. Vanderslice,
240 Miss. 55, 126 So.2d 522 (1961); State ex rel. Harbin v. Dunn, 39 Tenn.App. 190,
282 S.W.2d 203 (1943).
15 Andrews v. Porter, supra, n. 1; City of Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1963); Berry v. Hamman, 203 Va. 596, 125 S.E.2d 851 (1962); Davis v. Kendrick,
52 Cal.2d 517, 341 P.2d 673 (1959); Holland v. Martin, 214 Miss. 1, 56 So.2d 398 (1952);
Mollnow v. Rafter, 89 Misc. 995, 152 N.Y.S. 110 (1915); Kouns v. Townsend, 165 Ky.
163, 176 S.W. 989 (1915); Powers v. Sturtevant, 199 Mass. 265, 85 N.E. 84 (1908);
Loe v. Whitman, 87 So.2d 217 (La.App., 1956), holding that where an officer acts
pursuant to his authority, his personal liability becomes "merged" into that of the
municipality.
16 Mollnow v. Rafter, supra, n. 15; Floria v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City,
101 N.J.L. 535, 129 A. 470, 40 A.L.R. 1353 (1925); Goold v. Saunders, 196 Iowa 380,
194 N.W. 227 (1923).
17 See Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, supra, n. 13; Rayano v. City of New York,
138 N.Y.S.2d 267 (S.Ct. 1955).
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for the wanton, despotic use of the force which it has placed at the
police officer's command.18 The need to utilize a certain amount of
force in effecting an arrest has been recognized in all jurisdictions,'9
but the amount of force is limited by a "reasonableness" factor, i.e., the
police officer will have the burden of showing that the amount of force
which he employed was no more than was reasonably necessary to effect
the arrest. 20 The reasonableness of the police officer's actions is generally
examined from the point of view of the policeman at the time and under
the circumstances of the occurrence which led to the injury. It is unfair
to hold the police officer to limits of force expressed in pounds and
ounces, and the courts make every effort to instruct the jury not to
examine the defendant's actions from the point of view of a dispassioned
juror given the advantage of hindsight. 21 As Mr. Justice Holmes stated,
"Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted
knife." 22 It is left to the jury to determine the reasonableness of the
police officer's action. 23 The jury is aided in quite a few jurisdictions
by a presumption that the police officer acted in good faith in de-
termining the amount of force necessary to make the arrest. 24
Perhaps the initial factor which the jury examines in evaluating
the policeman's action will be whether the offense for which the plain-
tiff was sought to be arrested was a felony or a misdemeanor. This is
relevant because historically the peace officer could never use deadly
force or kill while attempting to arrest a misdemeanant, while he could
Is Colorado v. Hutchinson, 9 F.2d 275 (8th Cir., 1925).
19 Stephens v. City of St. Helens, 231 Ore. 1, 371 P.2d 686 (1962); Padilla v. Chavez,
62 N.M. 170, 306 P.2d 1094 (1957); State for Use of Holmes v. Pope, 212 Miss. 446,
54 So.2d 658 (1951); Kouns v. Townsend, supra, n. 15.
20 McCormick v. State of New York, 34 Misc.2d 806, 229 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1962); Alaniz
v. Funk, 69 N.M. 164, 364 P.2d 1033 (1961); Wendelboe v. Jacobson, 10 Utah2d 344,
353 P.2d 178 (1960); City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23 (Fla., 1960); Orr v. Walker,
228 Ark. 868, 310 S.W.2d 808 (1958); Pike v. Eubank, 197 Va. 692, 90 S.E.2d 821
(1956); Antwine v. Jones, 14 N.J. Super. 86, 81 A.2d 374 (1951); Garvey v. Ware,
139 F.S. 71 (D. Mass., 1956). See editorial notes, The Civil Liability of Peace Officers
for Wounding or Killing, 28 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 488, 493 (1959), which lists the many
state statutes providing that the limit of allowable force shall be that amount neces-
sary to effect the arrest.
21 Breese v. Newman, 179 Neb. 878, 140 N.W.2d 805 (1966); Oliver v. Kasza, 116
OhioApp. 398, 188 N.E.2d 437 (1962); Alaniz v. Funk, supra, n. 20; Anderson v. Fos-
ter, 73 Idaho 340, 252 P.2d 199 (1953); United States v. Jasper, 222 F.2d 632 (4th Cir.,
1955); Lippert v. State of New York, 207 Misc. 632, 139 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1955); Thomp-
son v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 116 W.Va. 705, 182 S.E. 880, 884 (1935); Sheehan v.
West, 27 R.I. 84, 60 A. 761 (1905). See Restatement, Torts 2d, §132; Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 866, 888.
22 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S.Ct. 561, 65 L. Ed. 961 (1921).
23 Breese v. Newman, supra, n. 21; Perry v. Gibson, 247 N.C. 212, 100 S.E.2d 341
(1957); State to Use of Holmes v. Pope, supra, n. 19; Human v. Goodman, 159 Tenn.
241, 18 S.W.2d 381 (1929); Colorado v. Hutchinson, supra, n. 18.
24 Rich v. Cooper, 234 Ore. 300, 380 P.2d 613 (1963); Schell v. Collis, 83 N.W.2d 422,
426 (N.D., 1957); Flamer v. Yonkers, 309 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E.2d 838 (1955); West v.
Nantz's Administrator, 267 Ky. 113, 101 S.W.2d 673, 678 (1937); Village of Barbours-
vile ex rel. Bates v. Taylor, 115 W.Va. 4, 174 S.E. 485 (1934).
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use such force against a felon in certain circumstances. 25 This distinc-
tion is expressed in the law of most jurisdictions today. In the case of
an attempted arrest of a felon, where there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the person whose arrest is sought is guilty of the commission
of that felony, 20 the officer may use all force necessary to capture the
felon, even to slaying him in flight.27 In the case of a misdemeanor, the
officer may defend himself reasonably from bodily harm,28 and he may
use sufficient force to effect the arrest by reasonably overcoming the
resistance which he may encounter; 29 but if the offender is simply
fleeing and not resisting, he has no right to use deadly force or to kill.
30
This is so because "[tihe law considers that it is better to allow him (a
petty offender) to escape altogether than to take his life or to do him
great bodily harm." 31 As may be discernible, the felony-misdemeanor
distinction concerning the tolerable limits of force which could be used
to effect an arrest was originally instituted to enable the peace officer
to apprehend those criminals whose freedom represented a real danger
to the community. 3 2 It has been stated that in practice the distinction
is ineffectual:
The felony-misdemeanor distinction is inherently incapable of
separating out those persons of such dangerousness that the perils
25 Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 136 S.E. 375, 376, 50 A.L.R. 262 (1927); State v.
Smith, 101 N.W. 110 (Iowa, 1904), rev'd, 127 Iowa 534, 103 N.W. 944 (1905).
26 Askay v. Maloney, 85 Ore. 333, 166 P. 29 (1917), rev'd on other grounds, 92 Ore.
566, 179 P. 899 (1919).
27 Alaniz v. Funk, supra, n. 20; Stinnett v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 55 F.2d 644
(4th Cir. 1932); Green v. State, 91 Ark. 510, 121 S.W. 727, 728 (1909). But see Fields
v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 334, 151 N.E.2d 188 (1958): "The common law rule
allowing an officer to kill a felon in order to arrest him cannot be extended to cases
of suspected felonies . . . To justify taking life, it must be shown that a felony had
actually been committed." Accord, City of Miami v. Nelson, 186 So.2d 535 (Fla.,
1966); People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 P. 799 (1894).
28 City of Festus v. Kausler, 77 S.W.2d 197 (Mo.App. 1934); State v. Smith, supra,
n. 25; cf., Rich v. Cooper, supra, n. 24.
29 Noback v. Town of Montclair, 33 N.J. Super. 420, 110 A.2d 339, 343 (1954):
". .. the law will not countenance the shooting or killing of a fleeing offender
charged merely with a misdemeanor [or] breach of the peace. . .. ." See Holland v.
Martin, supra, n. 15; Tuck v. Beliles, 153 Ky. 848, 156 S.W. 883 (1913); Powers v.
Sturtevant, supra, n. 15.
30 Piatkowski v. State, 43 Misc.2d 424, 251 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1964); Padilla v. Chavez,
supra, n. 19; Holloway v. Moser, supra, n. 25; Moore v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 180 So.
73 (1938); Human v. Goodman, supra, n. 23 at p. 381: "Except in self-defense, an
officer cannot resort to the extremity of killing or shedding blood in arresting or
preventing the escape of one charged with an offense less than felony, even though
the offender cannot be taken otherwise. The lawmaking power has not imposed the
death penalty for contravention or misdemeanor, and it cannot be assumed by
arresting officers that the power of life or death over persons accused or suspected
of misdemeanor has been extended to them; and they have no right to sacrifice
human life or to shed blood to prevent the escape of petty offenders." But see Orr
v. Walker, supra, n. 20.
31 State ex rel. Harbin v. Dunn, supra, n. 14, at p. 206. See Thomas v. Kinkead, 55
Ark. 802, 18 S.W. 854 (1892).
32 As well as a personal risk to the lawman from the possibility of ambush. Thomp-
son v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., supra, n. 21.
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arising from failure to accomplish immediate apprehension justify
resort to extreme force to accomplish it.3 3
One may further question the wisdom of this distinction, since under
modern legislation many statutory misdemeanors involve conduct more
dangerous to life and limb than many felonies,3 4 and prima facie it would
seem difficult and unnecessary for a police officer to determine, at his
peril, into which category a given offense may fall:
In the split second or so in which he might have an opportunity to
effect an arrest, he must at his peril go through a most problematic
"balancing" process to determine "reasonable cause" for the arrest
and the degree of force reasonably necessary. Confronted with such
a delicate choice and personal responsibility for its correctness, it
would not be surprising if police officers generally decided to err on
,the side of caution and think of home and family instead of the
public interest in law enforcement. 3
5
The jury's ultimate conclusion concerning the reasonableness of the
force employed may turn on any of the following additional factors as
well: the availability of alternative courses of conduct, i.e., methods by
which the suspect can be subdued without recourse to that quantum of
force used; :16 any physical disparities between plaintiff and defendant
as a result of which the defendant might feel it necessary to use greater
force; 37 whether or not plaintiff was armed with a deadly weapon; 3s the
violent or non-violent nature of the resistance employed by plaintiff; 39
the dangerous nature of a continuing misdemeanor, e.g., reckless
driving; 4o and what might be termed undue savagery, as where there is
no resistance at all, or the physical difference between the two parties
is so slight that less forceful means of capture could easily have been
employed. 41 Of course, an officer has no absolute right to kill, either to
33 Model Penal Code, § 3.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1956).
34 Model Penal Code, Ibid. See Caveat to Restatement, Torts 2d, § 131 (1965).
35 Mathes and Jones, op. cit. supra, n. 1, at p. 898.
36 Chaudoin v. Fuller, 67 Ariz. 144, 192 P.2d 243 (1948); Graham v. Ogden, 157 So.2d
365 (La.App. 1963).
37 Holland v. Martin, supra, n. 15: Dufrene v. Rodriguez, 38 So.2d 511 (La.App.
1949).
38 Burvick v. City of New York, 15 Misc.2d 478, 181 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1959); Holland v.
Martin, supra, n. 15 at p. 400: "A killing may not be justified on account of appre-
hension which is reasonably no more than that some minor battery might be in-
flicted on the defendant."
39 Hood v. Brinson, 30 Ill.App.2d 498, 175 N.E.2d 300 (1961) (incredulous question-
ing). The plaintiff's provocation, of course, may be a defense, subject to the reason-
ableness of the force used to meet that provocation. See Smith v. Clemmons, 48
So.2d 813 (La.App. 1950); Schell v. Collins, supra, n. 24.
40 Breese v. Newman, supra, n. 21 (reckless driving).
41 Bell v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 224 Cal.App.2d 257, 36 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1964);
Stephens v. City of St. Helens, supra, n. 19 (iron claw); Piatkowski v. State, supra,
n. 30; City of Charleston ex rel. Peck v. Dawson, 97 W.Va. 65, 125 S.E. 234 (1924);
Brown v. Wyman, 224 Mich. 360, 195 N.W. 52 (1923).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1967
16 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
take a prisoner or prevent his escape, even in the case of felons, unless
such action is reasonably necessary to prevent escape.42
It becomes relevant here to consider the right of the policeman to
arrest a suspect, since if a plaintiff is wrongfully apprehended by an
officer without proper authority to arrest him several courts allow him
the right to use reasonable force to escape. 43 This proper authority to
arrest may consist of a warrant,4 1 the plaintiff's committing a misde-
meanor in the officer's presence, 4 5 the officer's reasonable grounds to
believe that the plaintiff has committed a felony,4G or a statute au-
thorizing the arrest of a certain class of persons, e.g., drunks or va-
grants.4 7 While somewhat broad discretion is allowed the officer as to
the arrest of felons,48 significantly less discretion is allowed in the arrest
of a suspected misdemeanant. 49 And, although the officer's authority
may be unquestioned, the officer is often subject to a duty of informing
the offender of the offense for which the arrest is sought, the fact of the
impending arrest, and the officer's authority, before the use of force
will be legally justified. 50 This requirement may be waived, especially
where the plaintiff is apprehended during the commission of the offend-
ing act, in immediate pursuit thereafter, or in other extenuating cir-
cumstances.5 1
42 Fields v. City of New York, supra, n. 27; Human v. Goodman, supra, n. 23; Edgin
v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S.W. 591 (1925).
43 Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Circ., 1965); Ware v. Garvey, supra, n. 20; An-
derson v. Foster, supra, n. 21. Contra, Edgin v. Talley, supra, n. 42, Clark v. DeWalt,
65 Abs. 193, 114 N.E.2d 126 (1953).
44 Tuck v. Beliles, supra, n. 29; Restatement, Torts 2d § 131 (1965).
45 Lippert v. State of New York, supra, n. 21; Huth v. Woodward, 108 OhioApp. 135,
161 N.E.2d 230 (1958); Caffini v. Herrmann, 112 Me. 282, 91 A. 1009 (1914).
46 City of Miami v. Nelson, 186 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1966); Goold v. Saunders et al,
supra, n. 16; 6 C.J.S. Arrest, § 13. But see Bucher v. Krause, 200 F. 2d 576 (7th Cir.,
1952), holding that mere suspicion is not sufficient to justify a felony arrest.
47 Palmer v. Commonwealth, 252 S.W.2d 677 (Ky.App. 1952), in which the officer's
reasonable belief was held to constitute justification for the arrest. The right of the
defendant to make the arrest was assumed as a matter of law. Cf., Schweder v.
Baratko, 103 OhioApp. 399, 143 N.E.2d 486 (1957), where the court held that the sub-
sequent conviction of the plaintiff for the offense for which he was arrested was
conclusive in demonstrating the proper authority of the defendant police officer to
make the arrest. Whether or not excessive force was used was still left in issue.
48 Bourne v. Richardson, 133 Va. 441, 113 S.E. 893 (1922).
49 Ware et ux. v. Dunn, 80 Cal.App.2d 936, 183 P. 2d 128 (1947): "We are not cited
to a single case involving a misdemeanor wherein the conduct of the officer in mak-
ing the arrest . . . was considered in the light of 'reasonable grounds' or 'probable
cause' for causing such detention." Accord, Edgin v. Talley, supra, n. 42: "The
officer must determine at his peril whether an offense has been committed or not."
Contra, Perry v. Gibson, supra, n. 23, where the defendant's arrest of plaintiff mis-
demeanant was justified on defendant's reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff
had committed a misdemeanor.
50 Model Penal Code, § 3.07 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); Bearry v. Stringfellow,
246 Miss. 123, 149 So.2d 500 (1963); cf., City of Miami v. Nelson, supra, n. 46.
51 Brown v. Wyman, supra, n. 41: "The office of sheriff carries with it no command
to citizens to jump at the crook of his finger"; Burvick v. City of New York, supra,
(Continued on next page)
Sept., 1967
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss3/3
POLICE MISUSE OF WEAPONS
Thus far, the liability of the police officer for the use of excessive
force directed toward an offender, with intent to stop or injure the
offender, has been mooted. Liability may also attach, however, where
the defendant police officer injures the plaintiff offender without intent
to do so, as where a warning shot is fired to frighten the offender into
halting, or where a shot is fired at the tires of the fleeing offender's
automobile in order to force the car to a stop. Such use of the officer's
weapon has been sanctioned in several jurisdictions, where the officer
has been held non-negligent and not accountable for the resultant in-
juries to the offender, 52 and abhorred in others. 53 The Harbin court
was particularly emphatic:
When applied to persons guilty only of a misdemeanor . . . a prac-
tice so unnecessary, so wanton, and so hazardous . . . [as the shoot-
ing at tires to stop a car] is not to be tolerated in a civilized state.54
The court's antipathy toward this exercise of power finds support in the
Restatement, Torts 2d, § 135 (1965):
[T]he use of force against another for the purpose of effecting the
recapture of the other, who, having been lawfully arrested, has
escaped or been rescued, is privileged under the same conditions as
create the privilege to use force for the purpose of effecting his
arrest.
Injury to Innocent Bystander
No more justifiable claim for civil damages exists than that of the
innocent bystander who is injured solely as the result of the negligent
use of a firearm by a police officer. Perhaps it is because we expect so
much of those charged with the enforcement of the law that we least
expect those officers to be responsible for trespassing upon the personal
rights of innocent members of the public. Even though an officer may
be justified in shooting at an offender, a jury question may be presented
as to whether he was negligent in using his weapon at that particular
time or place. 5 Davis v. Hellwig0', involved a shooting in a busy
(Continued from preceding page)
n. 38; Schell v. Collis, supra, n. 24; Anderson v. Foster, supra, n. 21. The "extenu-
ating circumstances" alluded to might be a riot, People v. Young, 136 Cal.App. 699,
29 P.2d 440 (1934); Restatement, Torts 2d, § 142 (1965); or an immediate assault by
plaintiff suspect upon defendant policeman, so that such information is practically
impossible to communicate, Tuck v. Beliles, supra, n. 29.
52 Wimberley v. City of Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 183 A.2d 691 (1962); Alaniz v.
Funk, supra, n. 20; Breese v. Newman, supra, n. 21; State for Use of Holmes v. Pope,
supra, n. 19, where the absence of liability hinged upon the jury's finding that the
shooting was intended only to stop the misdemeanant's automobile.
53 State ex rel. Harbin v. Dunn, supra, n. 14; Edgin v. Talley, supra, n. 42.
54 Supra, n. 14 at 207. See Bobo v. City of Kenton, 186 Tenn. 515, 212 S.W.2d 363
(1948); State ex rel. Kaercher v. Roth, 330 Mo. 105, 49 S.W.2d 109 (1932).
55 Dyson v. Schmidt, 260 Minn. 129, 109 N.W.2d 262 (1961); Davis v. Hellwig, 21 N.J.
412, 122 A.2d 497, 60 A.L.R.2d 866 (1956).
56 Ibid.
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shopping district. The officer who used his revolver was held negligent
for not taking account of pedestrian traffic. It is the duty of the peace
officer placed in the position of justifiably shooting at an escaped felon
"to act with reasonable prudence to avoid the injury of innocent persons,
and the care must be commensurate with the danger involved [to those
persons]." 51 While we do not wish the street to become a "sanctuary for
a robber," neither should we leave room for the wantonness that may
accompany unbridled discretion in the application of deadly force.
Evaluation of that "reasonable prudence," particularly in a situa-
tion where the officer's firearm or revolver has caused the injury com-
plained of, will consist of the application of a high standard of care,"s
perhaps even to the point of utilizing a res ipsa loquitur rationale to
cast upon the defendant the burden of showing his freedom from negli-
gence.r' 9 Where the Officer's use of his weapon is both justified and rea-
sonable, liability will not attach. The following are illustrative: where
the foreseeable risk of harm to innocent bystanders is very slight,60
where a "sudden emergency" exists, e.g., an openly hostile mob of men
crowding around two military policemen (defendants) attempting to
arrest a drunken soldier, 1 or where a police officer reasonably believes
that an escaped felon for whom he is hunting is "in his sights," 62
liability is denied. A leading Minnesota decision has distinguished the
case in which the defendant police officer creates the very emergency
which resulted in plaintiff's injuries, and has imposed liability in that
situation. 3 The reasonableness of the policeman's action is for the jury
to determine,64 and the standard used is that of the reasonable man
under the circumstances existing at the time of the infliction of the
injury.65
57 Askay v. Maloney, supra, n. 26, at p. 904.
58 Wimberley v. City of Paterson, supra, n. 52; Collins v. City of New York, 171
N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. Co., 1958), aff'd 11 Misc.2d 710, 185 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1958), aff'd
7 N.Y.2d 822, 196 N.Y.S.2d 700, 164 N.E.2d 719 (1959); Crump v. Browning, 110 A.2d
695, 46 A.L.R.2d 1212 (Mun. Ct. App., D.C. 1955); Rives v. Bolling, 180 Va. 124, 21
S.E.2d 775 (1942); Askay v. Maloney, supra, n. 26. See 4 Shearman & Redfield on
Negligence 1742 (1941 Rev. ed.).
59 Crump v. Browning, supra, n. 58: "When the cause of injury is (1) known, (2) in
defendant's control, and (3) unlikely to do harm unless the person in control is
negligent, the defendant's negligence may be inferred without additional evidence."
See City of Charleston ex rel. Peck v. Dawson, supra, n. 41. As the Crump case
makes explicit, if res ipsa loquitur is not imposed, the innocent bystander must
assume the burden of explaining the accident and pinpointing the negligence.
60 Graham v. Ogden, supra, n. 36.
61 United States v. Jasper, supra, n. 21.
62 Berry v. Hamman, supra, n. 15; 62 C.J.S. 575 (Mun. Corp.).
63 Dyson v. Schmidt, supra, n. 55, discussed in Police Officers Held Negligent in
Creating Emergency Situation, 23 Ohio St. L. J. 164 (1962); Berry v. Hamman, supra,
n. 15.
64 Brown v. United States, supra, n. 22; Askay v. Maloney, supra, n. 26.
65 Rayano v. City of New York, supra, n. 17.
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In non-pursuit situations, that is to say, where the arrest of a suspect
is not involved, police officers may be held to a higher standard of care
than the ordinary, prudent man, principally because his training and
experience have acquainted him, presumably, with the nature, mecha-
nism, and proper use of firearms.6 6 While this higher standard of care
may apply in a case in which the police officer himself uses his weapon,6 7
it has not been applied to a situation where a police officer has negligently
allowed a prisoner to escape with the policeman's weapon, with which
the escapee injured an innocent bystander. The court refused to im-
pose liability upon the officer or the municipal employer, regardless of
the negligence which might have been proved.68
The Nature of the Liability Imposed Upon the Municipality
Respondeat Superior
Fundamentally, the municipality is an employer who has authorized
his agent to perform a specific task. Under ordinary agency principles,
when the police officer acts within the scope of his employment and
negligently causes injury the municipal employer should respond in
damages.6 9 So long as the officer is engaged in the general furtherance
of his employer's business, liability to the employer will attach regard-
less of a deviation from the "strict line of his duty." 70 The injured
66 Crump v. Browning, supra, n. 58. Contra, Nishan v. Godsey, 166 F.S. 6 (E.D.
Tenn., 1958), at p. 10: "The courts have not made the handling of pistols by officers
of a municipality analogous to the handling of instrumentalities such as dangerous
animals or railroad engines." See Rives v. Bolling, supra, n. 58; Hacker v. City of
New York, 26 A.D.2d 400, 275 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1966).
67 The Hacker case, supra, n. 66, applied this high standard where the policeman's
weapon discharged accidentally as he was cleaning it.
68 Scott v. City of New York, 2 A.D.2d 854, 155 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1956), rev'd 142
N.Y.S.2d 594 (1955): "[City] . . . owed no duty to the respondent, as a private
citizen, for damages incurred as the result of the escape and apprehension of the
prisoner, even if negligence thereafter be ascribed to [the city] . . .The respondent
would have to show a breach of a governmental duty fixed for his individual pro-
tection." Accord, Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, supra, n. 13: "A police officer's
duty to maintain effective custody of a suspect who has been arrested involves the
exercise of much judgment and discretion concerning the means used to keep the
suspect from escaping. . . . the officer is immune from civil liability to third per-
sons for damage done by a suspect who has managed to escape, because it would
not be in the public interest to make the officer's acts reviewable in civil litigation,
even if in a particular case a plaintiff may be able to prove negligence." Contra,
Young v. Kelley, 60 OhioApp. 382, 21 N.E.2d 602 (1938). cf., Schuster v. City of
New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1956).
69 McCormick v. State, 34 Misc.2d 806, 229 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1962); Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, supra, n. 13; Hacker v. City of New York, supra, n. 66; City of Green
Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1965). See Restatement, Agency,
§ 245: "A master who authorizes a servant to perform acts which involve the use
of force against persons or things . . . is subject to liability for a trespass to such
persons or things caused by the servant's unprivileged use of force exerted for the
purpose of accomplishing a result within the scope of employment. cf., Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 209 (1963).
70 Burns v. City of New York, 6 A.D.2d 30, 174 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1958) at p. 199: "The
tendency is to place on the master risks of all those whose faults may be regarded
as incidental to the enterprise, as it should be, rather than on the innocent victim."
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plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the act complained of oc-
curred while the defendant officer was acting within the scope of his
employment; he must meet this burden by a fair preponderance of the
evidence. 7 1
Because of the peculiar nature of the policeman's employment, the
municipal employer has been held liable for injuries inflicted as a
result of the officer's negligence, even where the policeman is technically
off duty,7 2 for the reason that he is required by statute or regulation
to be available to perform in his employer's behalf at all times,7 3 or be-
cause he is executing a function, e.g., cleaning a weapon, in furtherance
of his employer's interest.7 4 The time and place of such cleaning would
generally be considered immaterial.
Once the doctrine of respondeat superior is shown to apply, it is
unnecessary to consider whether there has been any negligence on the
part of a higher-echelon officer to establish municipal liability.
7 5
Knowledge of Dangerous Propensities of the Individual Officer
The municipal employer will generally be held liable where it has
retained an agent whose past history did in fact, or should have, put the
municipality on notice of the agent's propensity for violence or insta-
bility. 76 The initial consideration in this area is imposed by the concept
of proximate cause. It must be affirmatively shown that the negligence
of the municipality in failing to guard against potential hazard to mem-
bers of the public by not selecting proper or competent officers must
have proximately contributed to the injury complained of. This may
entail a showing of force beyond "excessive," perhaps "wanton" or
71 Hacker v. City of New York, supra, n. 66.
72 Burns v. City of New York, supra, n. 70. cf. Peer v. City of Newark, 71 N.J.Supcr.
12, 176 A.2d 249 (1961).
73 Collins v. City of New York, supra, n. 58; Hacker v. City of New York, supra,
n. 66, lower court opinion, 46 Misc.2d 1003, 261 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1965).
74 Rives v. Bolling, supra, n. 58.
75 McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960) at p. 831: "Subject to
the requirement that the negligence must be active rather than passive, so long as
the actual tortfeasor commits the wrong within the scope of his authorized duties,
there is no persuasive reason in law or morality which should distinguish one
servant or agent from another as a means of imposing liability on the municipal
principal or master when no such requirement exists as to the ordinary corporation."
76 Peters v. Bellinger, 22 Ill.App.2d 105, 159 N.E.2d 528 (1959); McCrink v. City of
New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947); Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal.2d 226, 138
P.2d 12 (1943). Contra, Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378 (1960); Luvaul
v. City of Eagle Pass, 408 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App., 1966). It should be emphasized
that negligence is not applied derivatively in these situations. Rather, we are con-
cerned with the actual negligence of the municipality for failure to appoint qualified
personnel, or failure to remove known incompetents (i.e., failure to properly carry
out a municipal function). Restatement, Torts 2d, § 307, recognizes that if an instru-
mentality is used which the actor (municipality) knows is incompetent and involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to others, the actor will be held negligent.
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"reckless." " The imposition of liability in this type of action has gen-
erally been phrased in terms of respondeat superior, or the maintenance
of a public nuisance,78 but it is well established that if negligence in
the selection of unfit persons or retention of known incompetents can
be shown on the part of members of the appointing authority, recovery
of damages against the municipality will follow subject to the proximate
cause limitation.79 This position is followed in the Restatement:
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person
to prevent him from doing such harm.80
A related problem involves suits brought against individual mem-
bers of the city council or appointing authority for negligence in failing
properly to supervise the selection of officers. Two cases have held city
council members liable for appointing a police officer, knowing of his
reckless propensities,"' while another has refused to impute the con-
ceded negligence of the appointing board to its individual members.8 2
The task of supervising underlings is considered discretionary under
Muskopf-Hargrove8 3 formulation. Fernelius v. Pierce,s4 perhaps the
leading case on the subject, favors a broad-based liability:
The law giving to a superior officer the power to suspend or remove
subordinates would be little more than a contribution to the ego of
the superior if it did not likewise place on him the correlative duty
of vigilantly exercising that power in the protection of the public
interest.8 5
The Fernelius case would hold legally responsible for the consequences
of an act those who permitted it with knowledge of its impending nature
and with the power and duty to prevent it.s ; Thus the deliberate tolera-
77 City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, supra, n. 69; Fernelius v. Pierce, supra,
n. 76 at p. 14.
78 City of Cumming v. Chastain, 97 Ga.App. 13, 102 S.E.2d 97 (1958). Where mu-
nicipal immunity for negligent torts exists, the immunity is generally not affected
by labelling the tort "nuisance." Defender v. City of McLaughlin, 228 F.Supp. 615
(N.D. S.D. 1964); Luvaul v. City of Eagle Pass, supra, n. 76.
79 Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 68 Am. Dec. 345 (1857); Peters v. Bellinger, supra, n.
76; McCrink v. City of New York, supra, n. 76. Contra, Luvaul v. City of Eagle
Pass, supra, n. 76.
80 Restatement, Torts 2d § 319 (1965).
81 Abrahamsohn v. City of Ceres, supra, n. 11. See Fernelius v. Pierce, supra, n. 76,
imposing liability upon a city manager.
82 Wray v. McMahon, 182 Miss. 592, 182 So. 99 (1938); cf. Laney v. Rush, 152 S.W.2d
491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
83 Supra, n. 13. See Steibitz v. Mahoney, 144 Conn. 443, 134 A.2d 71 (1959), imposing
a heavy burden on those who would assert an abuse of this discretion.
84 Supra, n. 76.
85 Id. at 21.
86 Id. at 20.
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tion of persons known to be "vicious" on a police force would be held to
lack legal justification.8 7
Another interesting California case has held that a chief of police,
in appointing a subordinate, is not liable for the latter's torts, both being
"servants of the law," and no master-servant relationship therefore exist-
ing between them.ss Liability of the chief is said to attach only upon
proof that he directed, participated in, or ratified the tortious act "so
as to make it his own in legal contemplation." 89 Perhaps Fernelius and
Michel are pointing toward the same conclusion, i.e., a court will ex-
amine the supervisor's selection procedure and will find negligence on
the part of the supervisor when an officer has caused an injury and his
past history should have cast doubt on his responsibility to employ
deadly force. A conclusion of this nature would be a wise step in pro-
moting employment of effective, capable, and responsible peace officers. 0
Liability for Lack of Training of the Individual Police Officer
Plaintiff's cause of action may be predicated upon the issuance of
firearms, tear gas guns, or other weapons capable of deadly force, to
police officers untrained in the proper, safe use of these weapons.9 1 It
is generally for the jury to determine the adequacy of the municipal
training afforded the police officer. Proximate cause likewise will raise
a jury issue.9 2 The court's examination of the training procedures used
by the municipality may be detailed: in the Peer case, the court ex-
amined safety training for carrying a loaded revolver off duty; instruc-
tions as to type of holster to be used during off-duty hours; safety de-
vices provided by the police department; retraining, including dry and
range firing; films shown; and police manuals distributed.93 Generally,
87 See Peters v. Bellinger, supra, n. 76, holding that a city may be held liable di-
rectly for the tortious acts of its public officers following the Molitor decision, supra,
n. 13. The public officer involved had been a participant in many street brawls and
even convicted of grand larceny. During the course of making an arrest for drunk
driving, the officer struck the plaintiff with such violence that plaintiff lost the sight
of one eye. Rev'd, 19 Ill.2d 367, 166 N.E.2d 581 (1960). Molitor was held to have
prospective application only (the instant action arose before the Molitor decision).
88 Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199, 205 P. 113 (1922), contra, State ex rel. Coffelt v.
Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 44 Tenn.App. 405, 314 S.W.2d 161 (1958).
89 Michel v. Smith, supra, n. 88. See Strickfaden v. Green Creek Highway District,
42 Idaho 738, 248 P. 456, 49 A.L.R. 1057 (1926); Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182, 203
S. W. 949 (1918); cf., David, Tort Liability of Public Officers, 12 So. Cal. L. Rev. 127
(1938).
90 Cf. Scott v. City of New York, supra, n. 68.
91 Nishan v. Godsey, supra, n. 66. It would seem that some training requirement
should be imposed for any instrument whose normal or adaptive uses are likely to
produce serious injury, as a tear gas weapon of fountain pen size. See Village of
Barboursville ex rel. Bates v. Taylor, supra, n. 24.
92 Peer v. City of Newark, supra, n. 72.
93 Peer v. City of Newark, ibid. A lower court opinion, subsequently reversed, has
indicated that the arming of an officer who has been exposed to only five of sixteen
(Continued on next page)
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courts have had little difficulty utilizing lack of training as a satisfactory
basis for municipal liability.94 The Restatement supports this position:
It is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether a human being
or a thing, which the actor knows or should know to be so in-
competent, inappropriate, or defective, that its use involves an un-
reasonable risk of harm to others. 95
One New York case has held that where injury results from the police-
man's use of his firearm, a showing that the officer had not received
proper training in the use of such firearms was sufficient to establish
a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the municipality.96
Measure of Damages
We have examined the personal liability of the policeman for the
negligent use of his weapon and the liability of the municipal employer,
both direct and derivative, growing out of the same fact situations. What
remains to be discussed is the measure of damages recoverable by the
injured plaintiff.
There is no striking differential between the elements of damages
allowable in a police tort action from those allowable in the normal
negligence suit. Compensation for hurt is the basic aim.97 Damages
have been allowed in special circumstances for mental anguish unac-
companied by physical harm9 s but disallowed where the only claim in-
volved fear engendered in the plaintiff's mind as a result of the conse-
quences of the attempted arrest.9 9 If the officer is justified in using
force against the plaintiff, he will be held liable only for so much of
the force as is determined to be excessive. 10 0
(Continued from preceding page)
lessons in the use of firearms provided by the municipality may be negligence.
Hacker v. City of New York, 46 Misc.2d 1003, 261 N.Y.S.2d 757, rev'd 26 A.D.2d 400,
275 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1966).
94 McAndrew v. Mularchuk, supra, n. 75; Peters v. Bellinger, supra, n. 76; Meis-
tinsky v. City of New York, 285 A.D. 1153, 140 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y.
998, 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956).
95 Restatement, Torts 2d, § 307 (1965).
96 Meistinsky v. City of New York, supra, n. 94.
97 City of Hialeah v. Hutchins, 189 So.2d 165 (Fla., 1966). The enumeration of the
"hurt," as may be expected, varies widely. In Tennessee, recovery may be had for
"physical pain, mental anguish, for the affront to his personality, the indignity, dis-
grace, humiliation, and mortification . . ." attendant upon the tort, Garner v. State
ex Tel. Askins, 37 Tenn.App. 510, 266 S.W.2d 358 (1953), while in Illinois loss of stand-
ing in the community is not a compensable item. Hood v. Brinson, supra, n. 39.
98 Laney v. Rush, supra, n. 82 at p. 494: The "special circumstances" involved a
willful, wanton, malicious assault whose "obvious purpose is to wound, humiliate, or
oppress another."
99 Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So.2d 442 (Fla., 1959).
100 Powers v. Sturtevant, supra, n. 15; City of Fort Pierce v. Cooper, 190 So. 2d 12
(Fla., 1966). Restatement, Torts 2d, § 71(a), § 133(a), § 144(a) (1965).
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The assessment of punitive damages may be difficult. Where a
deputy commits a tort within the scope of his employment and the sheriff
is sued, punitive damages may be imposed on the sheriff by the doctrine
of respondeat superior.""' A recent Arizoha case, however, has reached
the opposite conclusion:
A sheriff may not be held for punitive damages for the acts of his
deputy (although punitive damages were assessed against the
deputy) unless he has directed, participated in, acquiesced, or rati-
fied those acts. 102
Punitive damages have traditionally been disallowed against munici-
palities because of the obvious difficulty of offering evidence of un-
limited taxing power of the municipal corporation to ascertain the
measure of a proper verdict based upon the financial worth of the de-
fendant.103 Better reasoning is exemplified in the opinion of the dis-
senting judge in the Fischer case:
If . . . municipal corporations are liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for damages proximately resulting from the
torts of their police officers acting in the scope of employment, their
liability should not be any less or different than that of a business
corporation under like circumstances.10 4
Preparation for Trial
The responsibility of the attorney representing an injured plaintiff
in an action brought against the police officer and municipal employer
is one that requires the highest standards of professional diligence. Al-
though possible theories of recovery are varied, each is only as good as
the evidence which is produced to back it up. Full utilization of pre-
trial procedure is a necessity. In those jurisdictions allowing pretrial
discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are
certain avenues open to plaintiff's attorney which must be taken.
Notice to Produce
Plaintiff's attorney should begin discovery by notifying the defend-
ant municipality to produce certain documents and other tangible records
pertaining to the defendant police officer, including the application for
employment, civil service report and pre-employment investigation re-
port. Any departmental proceeding brought against the police officer
should be included. The police officer should be required to produce his
101 State ex rel. Coffelt v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., supra, n. 88.
102 Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407 P. 2d 917, 922 (1965).
103 Fisher v. City of Miami, supra, n. 5. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort
Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1931); case comments, Punitive Damage Liability of
Municipal Corporations, 22 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 126 (1965).
104 Carroll, J., dissenting in Fisher v. City of Miami, 160 So.2d 57, 61 (Fla., 1964),
rev'd, supra, n. 5.
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military service record; it may turn out that either disciplinary action
based upon his excessive violence or cruelty has been taken against
him, or his proficiency rating in the use of firearms may have been low.
The pertinent local agency, e.g., town clerk, should be called upon
to produce the ordinance instituting the police departmental rules and
regulations with regard to hiring practices, training in the use of fire-
arms, and standards of proficiency set up by the department.
The weapon used in the accident should be produced by whoever
has custody of it. The police officer should produce the holster used to
carry the weapon on the day of the accident. If an accident report has
been filed with the police department, it should be obtained and verified.
Written Interrogatories
In the course of propounding interrogatories to be served upon the
defendant, plaintiff's attorney should ensure that the following subjects
are covered: (1) the defendant should be required to set forth names
and addresses of all witnesses who have knowledge of relevant facts, for
possible oral deposition later; (2) the chain of command in the municipal
government, particularly with regard to the Department of Public
Safety; (3) the names of the superior officers in command over the
defendant officer; (4) whether or not the gun was inspected before and
after the accident, and if so, by whom, when, why, and the result of the
inspection; (5) when was the weapon issued to the police officer; (6)
previous accidental shootings, if any, in which the defendant officer was
involved; (7) whether or not the police officer had fired the particular
gun prior to the accident, and if so, the circumstances surrounding the
firing.
With regard to the training program of the police department, the
following issues are relevant: (1) what training the police officer re-
ceived prior and subsequent to the issuance of the gun, what instruc-
tions he received, and how often he had target practice; (2) whether
or not the police department had safety regulatiors or standards re-
garding the handling of firearms; (3) what printed material, if any,
had been given to the officer, such as departmental manuals or brochures
relating to the weapon;. (4) whether any outside agencies participated
in the training program such as F. B. I. or civilian experts, and the
qualifications of each instructor; (5) whether there are any departmental
records kept pertaining to the training program; (6) whether the officer
received any additional training beyond the elementary, and any rec-
ords pertaining to this training. The defendant municipality should be
required to set forth in detail the method of selection and hiring of
members of the police department, all standards used in the selection,
and copies of written examinations, interviews and mental or psychologi-
cal tests taken by the defendant policeman.
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Oral Deposition
The most important pretrial procedure is the use of oral deposition.
Here plaintiff's attorney has the opportunity to depose the defendant's
superiors, and to receive their spontaneous answers to his questions con-
cerning the selection and training of the defendant policeman. Among
those who should be deposed are the chief of police, the head of the
Department of Public Safety, the defendant, fellow police officers who
have knowledge of his behavior, and instructors in pistol and firearm
training. The witnesses should be required to produce any records in
their custody, pertaining to the selection and training of the defendant.
There are many retired members of municipal police depart-
ments, state police organizations, or the F. B. I., who qualify as experts
in the use of firearms. These men can advise plaintiff's counsel as to
prevailing standards of training. Reference may be made to the Na-
tional Riflemen's Association and the National Institute of Criminology
for additional standards. The manufacturers of various types of weapons
should be consulted with regard to brochures which describe the safe,
proper methods of handling the particular firearm.
Conclusion
The historical tradition that the King can do no wrong has been
abrogated by the development of the common law. Not only is he re-
sponsible for his own torts, he is also responsible for the torts of all the
King's men. Municipalities are responsible for the negligent acts of
police officers committed within the scope of their employment, and this
scope of employment is extended by time and space and carries around
the clock.
The attorney representing a litigant who claims injury as the re-
sult of the negligence of a police officer in the use of his firearms has
a broad responsibility. He must utilize pretrial discovery procedures to
the fullest. He cannot sit on his rights and wait for the facts to unfold
before him.
It has been stated that immunity breeds neglect, while liability en-
courages care. With the trend of judicial decisions imposing liability
upon police officers, we can look forward to more efficient and specialized
training by municipalities of their police officers, with resultant greater
protection for society.
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